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Abstract 
 The philosopher Thomas Nagel is well known for being skeptical of 
the claim that psychological states are purely physical. When physical 
science gives us a complete description of the world, it leaves out the point 
of view from which each of us is aware of their perspective on the world. 
This paper is a critical treatment of Nagel's problem with physicalism. We 
ignore the vast literature on the self. 
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Thomas Nagel is skeptical that a purely physical account of a human 
existence could be completely true. He argues that a person is a subject of 
mental states, which involves more than materialism can explain. Once one 
has completely described the physical being of the self, he says, one is left 
with a self that is also the “subject” of this description: 
The problem can be shown to be general in the following 
way: consider everything that can be said about the world 
without employing any token-reflexive expressions. This will 
include a description of all its physical contents and their 
states. . . It will also include a description of all persons in the 
world and their histories, memories, thoughts, sensations, 
perceptions, intentions, and so forth. I can describe without 
token-reflexives the entire world and everything in it—and 
this will include a description of Thomas Nagel and what he 
is thinking and feeling. But there seems to remain one thing I 
cannot say in this fashion—namely, which of the various 
persons in the world I am. And when everything that can be 
said in the specified manner has been said, and the world in a 
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sense has been completely described, there seems to remain 
one fact that has not been expressed, and that is the fact that I 
am Thomas Nagel. This is the fact that I am the subject of 
these experiences; this body is my body; the subject or the 
center of my world is this person, Thomas Nagel. (Nagel, 
1965) 
 It follows from this, he continues, that a sensation's “being mine” 
cannot consist in its being an attribute of any substance, such as a body or 
even a soul. For “nothing in the specification of that soul will determine that 
it is me, and that I am that person.” Any substance we pick as the substance 
of psychological states can be thrown into the objective world. And 
everything about it is completely described except that I am that person. 
Nagel concludes from this that the self is not a substance of any sort and that 
“the special kind of possession which characterizes the relation between me 
and my psychological states cannot be represented as the possession of 
certain attributes by a subject” (Nagel, 1965).  
Although this argument seems plausible, Nagel’s conclusion does not 
follow because his linguistic analysis cannot show that something has 
actually been omitted from a physicalistic description of the world or that if 
it has been, that what is left out is not itself physical. No matter how detailed 
the token-reflexive-free description is, and no matter in what terms it is 
couched, such a description cannot possibly say which of the persons in the 
world I am, or which one anyone else is. The removal of token-reflexive-free 
expressions in philosophy has been associated with the attempt to create an 
ideal language which could describe every fact in the world with statements 
that are not context bound. However, such a cleansing of language would do 
more than make it impossible for me to indicate which of the people in the 
world I am. It would make it impossible for me to indicate who others are 
(which I do in relation to myself), and make it impossible for me to indicate 
where I am or when I am speaking or thinking with respect to the past, 
present, or future. Demonstratives, pronouns, and tenses would be eliminated 
from such a language. But even if we accept such an ideal token-reflexive 
free physicalistic language, it does not follow either that I am a physical or 
nonphysical thing. The mere fact that I have been left out of the description 
of the world has no implications about what sort of thing I am. For I could 
just add on a physicalistic description of myself. This could lead to an 
infinite regress for then I would not be able to say that it is my description of 
myself.  
It does not follow, as Nagel says it does, that the subject of 
experiences cannot be a thing, or that a mental state’s being mine cannot 
consist in its being an attribute of a thing--unless we make a further 
assumption that for a thing to be what I am, qua subject of experiences, 
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something in the specification or description of that thing must determine 
that it is mine, or which person I am. But this assumption will not work in 
any other context. There is nothing in a description of a chair that determines 
that it is this chair rather than some other chair. However, pointing out other 
contexts where the same point can be made does not remove the difficulty, 
because this can always be traced back to the use of 'I'. What makes this 
chair this chair is the fact that it is the chair that I am looking at or pointing 
to. I can pick out which chair 'this chair' refers to for someone else, and they 
can identify it, because it is anchored to my point of view. Others can 
understand me because they can understand what I mean by 'this chair' from 
features of the situation such as my gestures, my use of the pronoun 'I', and 
the like. The important point here is that my use of 'I' in order to say which 
person I am talking about has no bearing at all on what sort of thing I am, or 
whether I am a thing at all, or on whether I am a mental of physical 
substance or thing. Nor does it have anything to do with the fact that “this 
body” is my body. What makes my body the particular body it is does not 
depend on the question of whether my body can be individuated without the 
use of token-reflexives. It does involve facts such as my feeling something 
when “this body” has something touching it in part that makes it my body, 
and this is quite different from what makes my body separate and different 
from other bodies. Philosophers who claim the pronoun 'I' individuates and 
has nothing to do with the kind of thing I am sometimes deny that the self is 
a substance of any kind or a subject of experience. For instance, S. Coval 
writes that: 
Questions such as 'Under what conditions am I a “self” or an 
“I” ? or 'When am I first-person?' have sometimes been 
answered in terms of 'consciousness' or 'experience' or 
'thinking' or their cognates. But to be an 'I' , or a 'Self', one 
need only be speaking or using the first person pronoun. . 
.nothing more. The present performance of speech is the 
necessary condition for the use of the first person. . . . Only 
when one is actually in the act of speaking, or its derivatives, 
is one ever capable of being a 'self' or an 'I.' (Coval, 1966)  
 Coval holds that the only sense in which one is a subject of 
experiences occurs when one is the grammatical subject of discourse and, 
further, only when one is actually speaking. Immanuel Kant said that the 'I 
think' must be able to accompany all of our representations, and Coval is 
likewise saying that 'I say' must be able to accompany all of our speech acts, 
and that this is the only sense in which one is an I, a self, or subject of 
anything. There is no subject of experiences, but only a subject of discourse, 
made explicit in first person performances of speech acts. 
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However, this way out is too short because it denies that we are 
people who have thoughts, feelings, and desires. This is all we mean when 
we say that there is something, some substance, which has and undergoes 
these mental states. The physicalist is maintaining that it is the same 
substance that has and undergoes physical states, and this substance is the 
brain and human body. There are subjects of experience even without the 
features of the word  'I'.  
We may yet feel that something has been left out in a scientific 
description of the world that does not contain demonstratives or pronouns, 
even when we allow for the use of token-reflexive words and statements. 
The suspicion is that our essential subjectivity, the fact that I am a subject of 
these experiences, that I am the center of my world, can never be captured in 
the facts about the world. In one sense this sounds absurd, because that there 
are people having certain experiences and having separate points of view is a 
fact about the world, just as it is a fact about the world that I am now 
thinking of this problem. When I consider myself as subject, as the center of 
my world, I consider myself as occupying a single and unique point of view, 
and this itself is a fact about the world, but not about my world. There is an 
important sense in which each person's point of view is unique and singular, 
giving one a system of reference that has oneself as the center. This explains 
why we feel that something has been left out of any complete scientific 
description of the world, for the facts of science do not mention any singular 
point of view, including my own. 
Against Nagel, one can argue that I can always add on a physical 
description of myself as the person who is writing the description of the 
world. But that will not solve the problem, for I must leave out the fact it is 
me who is writing the description. I cannot include in my description of 
myself the fact that it is my description without being landed in an infinite 
regress. This is exactly what Gilbert Ryle has called the systematic 
elusiveness of the 'I.' Ryle talks about higher order acts, which themselves 
can result in yet another higher order act, and so on. He says that “self-
commentary, self-ridicule, and self-admonition are logically condemned to 
eternal penultimacy”(Ryle, 1949). I can never catch my innermost self; I am 
always referring to what I just did or of what I was aware and not the self.  In 
self-awareness I can never tell whether the self is a physical thing or not, but 
I am aware that I am something, a thing that thinks. This is a reflective act of 
self-awareness. I am not aware of this thinking thing as being physical or as 
nonphysical, but just aware that something is doing the thinking (Smythe, 
2012). 
To return to Nagel, in a physicalistic description of the world, all the 
points of view are there, but none of them is especially privileged; there is no 
center. If two or more people set out to write up the same description of the 
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world, they will have to leave out any mention of who is writing it, and the 'I' 
will not appear in the description because 'I' refers to that point of view 
which constitutes a unique system of reference. This is not to say that one's 
own conscious center of awareness will be omitted from such a description, 
and, therefore, amounts to nothing. What is omitted is the fact that it is my 
conscious center of awareness, even though I am in the world and I am 
something. It might seem that there is one subject of all experiences 
(myself), and this is left out of such a description., but there really is no 
single point of view or privileged self whose point of view is the point of 
view. Consider some related passages from Wittgenstein in this connection:  
5.631 If I wrote a book called The World As I Found It, I 
should have to include a report on my body, and should have 
to include which parts were subject to my will, and which 
were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or 
rather of showing that in an important sense there is no 
subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in that book. 
5.632 The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is 
the limit of the world. (Wittgenstein, 1921) 
Nagel tries to formulate some intuitive discomforts which grow out of 
a dissatisfaction with physicalism. However, once these misgivings are 
unpacked they can be seen to be unfounded or the result of confusion. One 
source of confusion is the suspicion that I cannot possibly be my body 
because my body is something I own or possess. Once it is seen that that 
phrases such as “my body” and “my mind” cannot be construed on the model 
of “my car,” the source of discomfort can be dispelled. “My body” seems to 
refer to something over and above my body, that owns my body, but “my 
car” does not seem to mislead us that way. It is clear that I am separable 
from my car, but it is problematic whether I am something separable from 
my body. Elsewhere I have tried to say what a materialist could say about 
what makes my body mine (Smythe, 2012). It is to the advantage of a 
materialist to construe such locutions as “persons owning their bodies” or 
“the self which possesses this body.” These phrases can make it seem that a 
person cannot be just a physical thing. 
Nagel articulates a better objection to physicalism in terms of what is 
left out of a physicalistic description of the world that does not include 
token-reflexives. But the use of token-reflexive terms to individuate items 
has no bearing on what kind of thing it is, or on the nature of the thing. Nor 
should this fact lead one to deny that a person is an I, a self, or a subject in 
the sense of being something which has and undergoes psychological states 
and processes. One can still feel that they occupy a unique and singular point 
of view, like a fixed point in a turning, changing world. This feeling that 
something essential and inner about oneself has been left out of a 
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physicalistic description of the world is due partly to the elimination of any 
unique system of reference or point of view. If two people give a complete 
description of a room in which they are both located, they would give the 
same description only if they left something out, namely, who is writing the 
description, because this itself is not part of the description of the room. The 
sense in which the world is my world would be left out by physicalism.  
Another factor that contributes to the view that one's “self” is 
privileged and occupies a unique point of view is that we seem to have 
underprivileged access to our own bodies as objects of scientific 
investigation. My access to my body is not like my accessibility to the bodies 
of others, or like my access to other material objects. I can see other bodies 
from many different points of view and inspect them from different 
distances. But I cannot ordinarily do that with my own body. I experience 
my own body always from the same point of view and cannot vary my 
distance from my own body or take a good look from many different angles. 
My experience of my own body has a constancy and invariability not shared 
by my experience of any other body. I can only imagine being in the place of 
another person observing my body the way I observe their body. 
We can observe the motion of other things, but not in the same way 
that we observe the motion of our body. When we are being moved, as when 
we are riding on a train, we can experience our bodies as moving in relation 
to other things, and this is much like the way we notice that other bodies are 
moving. But when we move our bodies, we do not find out that our body is 
moving by observing it in relation to other things. We can know other bodies 
are moving by merely observing them, and by watching them trace a 
continuous path through space, but we cannot do this with ourselves in this 
same detached way. We can follow other things and people around and 
observe them continuously from one place to another, but we cannot follow 
ourselves.  
Usually, we know about the movement of other things on the basis of 
continuous observation or inferences between discontinuous stretches of 
observation, but this is not usually the way we know that we are moving 
from place to place. We know about our own movements on the basis of 
continuous experience and memory, and do depend on observations such as 
those in a reflected image to experience our own bodies. We also have 
privileged access our own minds, which encourages us to slide into the view 
that oneself occupies a unique and privileged point of view not dependent on 
empirical investigation.  
Yet, in some ways, we have a different, inferior access to our body 
than we do to other bodies. When we do see ourselves as objects of empirical 
investigation, we connect ourselves with the feeling that our own unique and 
singular point of view is left out of an empirical description. We may begin 
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to believe that we must be more than body. The feeling that the self has been 
left out of the description results from an asymmetry between our superior 
empirical access to the bodies of others compared to our own body 
considered as an object of empirical investigation. There is also an 
asymmetry between our knowledge of the mental states of others and the 
knowledge one has of their own mental states. I can know that Jones has a 
headache only by way of some bodily or behavioral facts about Jones, but I 
know I have a headache without knowing anything about my body or 
behavior. My incomplete access to my body as an empirical object can be 
put alongside of my privileged epistemic access to my states of mind in a 
way that makes it seem that I cannot possibly be just a body. But this does 
not by itself show that I am in fact not just a physical thing. It does show it is 
hard to believe I am just a physical thing. 
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